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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND DEVOLUTION 
by Professor David Bell, Department of 
Economics, University of Stirling 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
This paper looks at an economic issue that is 
emerging as one of the most important that will 
face the new Scottish parliament, namely how to 
deal with public sector investment Investment in 
capital assets is essential to the wellbeing of the 
population and the continued growth of the Scottish 
economy. Hospitals, schools, roads and water all 
require steady investment if they are to deliver the 
services that the public expects. Devolution will 
allow the Scottish parliament to develop its own 
policy on public investment Hence it is worth 
setting out the main factors that might influence 
such a policy. A review is also important at this 
time because of important changes that are taking 
place in the way that the UK as a whole deals with 
public investment. 
As a concrete example, suppose that the party or 
coalition in power in the Scottish Parliament has 
made a commitment to reduce hospital waiting 
lists. Early in its term it discovers that this 
reduction will only be possible if several new 
hospitals are built around Scotland. However, no 
additional resources are available, either through 
the block grant from Westminster or from taxation. 
How can it proceed? The devolution bill prevents it 
from incurring long-term debt. Should it bring in 
private sector finance to build the hospitals? If so, 
what inducements will be needed to persuade the 
private sector to invest? 
The idea of using private sector finance to fund 
public projects implies that government may be an 
agent in investment without necessarily owning 
capital assets. Scots have been less enthusiastic 
about privatisation than those south of the border. 
The successful opposition to water privatisation is 
an example of their less than ringing endorsement 
of the privatisation process. However, 
privatisations have occurred all over the world 
during the last two decades, resulting in substantial 
transfers of ownership of capital assets from the 
public to the private sector. 
The view taken in this paper is pragmatic. It 
recognises that all forms of investment involve risk 
as well as potential reward and that government 
may have an important role in delivering or 
enabling investment. Growth and improved living 
standards in Scotland depend on risk-taking. It is 
often mistakenly thought that public sector 
investment is relatively risk free. The Scottish 
experience with local authority housing shows that 
this is far from the case. The outstanding debt on 
local authority housing is around £3.9bn. A large 
proportion of the rental income is being used to 
service the debt with the result that properties are 
not being properly maintained. If the housing stock 
was sold its market value would be substantially 
less than the existing debt, resulting in a substantial 
capital loss for the public sector. 
Ownership of assets is important only if it affects 
either the selection of capital projects or their 
operation. No matter how these assets are financed, 
it is the case that failure to invest would not only 
have serious consequences for the Scottish 
economy but would also be unfair to future 
generations. The parliament will quickly have to 
establish a policy on whether and how to support 
public sector projects. This will have to take 
account of relevant UK policies. Particularly 
important are: 
1. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
2. The change to "resource accounting" 
3. The introduction of the "Golden Rule" for 
fiscal stability 
The PFI is the starting point from which any 
change in policy by the Scottish parliament is 
likely to be measured. The introduction of 
"resource accounting" will improve the 
management of capital assets in the public sector 
compared with the current norm, which is simple 
cash budgeting. The Golden Rule will impose a 
strict fiscal discipline on the UK as a whole. 
Although it cannot be directly applied to the 
financing of the Scottish parliament, some of the 
arguments that he behind it are relevant to 
Scotland. 
The paper will discuss these issues in some detail 
but it begins by rehearsing the main economic 
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arguments concerning the relative merits of public 
and private finance. In practice, the Scottish 
parliament may have little choice but to opt for 
private sector funding for substantial new 
initiatives, but it is nevertheless useful to consider 
the arguments for and against public sector 
funding. Many of these arguments can be found in 
Flemtning and Mayer (1997). 
SECTION 2: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE 
FINANCE? 
The Scottish Parliament will control a budget of 
around £15bn that will be shared between its 
various departments — health, education, transport 
etc. In turn these departments will allocate their 
budgets between capital and current spending. 
Because of current accounting conventions it is 
difficult to take an overall view of the balance of 
Scottish Office spending between current and 
capital purposes. The change to resource 
accounting in the public sector will make this 
information more readily available in the near 
future. However, the information will be of little 
value if it is not properly used. This requires an 
appreciation of the main issues in the debate about 
whether public projects should be funded by the 
public or the private sector. 
Why should the Scottish Parliament invest in 
capital assets at all? In the 1970s, such a question 
would not have been taken seriously, but as 
privatisation spread during the 1980s the 
conventional view of government as owner, 
operator and regulator of services changed 
radically. Many enterprises were moved from the 
public to the private sector. Instead of seeking 
investment finance from government, these now 
raise funds on the private capital market. The UK 
public sector is much smaller than it was in the 60s 
and 70s and while government may have some role 
to play in providing capital assets, it is no longer 
accepted that this role should necessarily include 
all three functions - ownership, operation and 
regulation. A much more mixed view of public 
sector provision has emerged, though the 
government has retained the regulation function. 
Indeed regulation is now more intensive than was 
the case in the pre-privatisation era and arguably 
has contributed to improvements in service and 
reductions in prices for the bulk of consumers of 
services such as telecommunications, gas and 
electricity. In contrast, the experience thus far of 
privatisation in the rail industry has not been as 
satisfactory. 
The standard argument is that government should 
own and operate industries where no competitive 
market exists. Enterprises supplying 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and rail 
services, for example, were argued to be "natural" 
monopolies. If owned by the state, these enterprises 
could be more easily prevented from exploiting 
their monopoly position than privately owned 
firms. However, privatisation coupled with active 
regulation has shown that this is not necessarily the 
case. The regulators have been able to create 
markets where none previously existed, thus 
reducing the scope for the exertion of monopoly 
power. Markets in telecommunications, in power 
generation, and in gas distribution have all been 
created in industries that were previously thought 
to be "natural" monopolies. 
Two arguments have been put forward in favour of 
the process of privatisation. These are (1) reducing 
the cost of borrowing and (2) increased efficiency. 
We consider these in turn before examining the 
arguments against. 
Reducing the Cost of Borrowing 
The first argument is that privatisation should be 
encouraged to reduce the PSBR and so cut the cost 
of borrowing. The first component of this argument 
is correct. Under current national accounting 
definitions, private sector finance reduces the 
PSBR, but the idea that this in rum will cut the cost 
of borrowing is largely spurious. Various 
subterfuges have been suggested to move 
borrowing off the government's balance sheet. The 
only plausible rationale for this is to satisfy 
international bodies that assess public sector 
liabilities fairly narrowly. But whether its source is 
the conventionally defined public sector or some 
alternative body, borrowing to fund investment will 
not have a substantively different effect on the cost 
of capital than will private sector borrowing. It may 
influence the relative demands for equity and loan 
finance but this will only change the relative cost of 
raising funds by these mechanisms. 
Private finance has an apparently beneficial impact 
on the PSBR because government, rather than 
paying to create some new asset, instead contracts 
to buy the services provided by an asset created by 
the private sector. Thus, for example, the extension 
of the M6 between Carlisle and Glasgow has been 
paid for by the private sector under the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFT). The government will not 
own the road, but instead will pay the owners an 
annual fee based on the number of vehicles using 
the road. Government has not met the immediate 
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cost of building the road and therefore there is no 
immediate adverse impact on the PSBR. However, 
the government does have a set of liabilities 
stretching into the future (the annual fees), which 
must cover the cost of building the road and the 
risks run by the contractors. The PFI reduces the 
government's immediate borrowing requirement It 
does not reduce its overall liabilities. As we shall 
emphasise subsequently, it is important that the 
Scottish parliament's accounts recognise such 
liabilities. 
Efficiency Gains 
The more substantive argument in favour of private 
ownership is that of greater efficiency. Many of the 
internal mechanisms of a private company, such as 
profit sharing, performance bonuses etc., can be put 
in place in public sector enterprises. Attempts have 
been made by past and present governments to 
introduce such mechanisms. However, there is one 
feature of the private sector that the public sector 
cannot successfully reproduce - the discipline 
offered by external control, which comes in three 
forms1: 
1. direct intervention by external shareholders 
2. ownership changes 
3. bankruptcy and insolvency 
Private sector firms are subject to these disciplines 
while those in the public sector are not. If there is 
indeed greater efficiency in the private sector, its 
origins he in the differences in the incentives that 
external control brings about. This is a key 
argument. Private sector firms that are not making 
the best use of their assets are subject to the threat 
of take-over or closure. These dangers provide 
strong incentives to improved performance and are 
difficult to reproduce in the public sector. 
There are counter-arguments in favour of 
continuing to use public finance for public sector 
investment. These are: 
1. adverse selection 
2. governments' information advantages 
3. lower cost of capital in the public sector 
We now consider these arguments in some detail. 
Adverse Selection 
The adverse selection argument has to do with 
some investors exploiting private information to 
their financial advantage. A number of 
privatisations have been to the particular benefit of 
a small proportion of the population that has made 
windfall gains from increases in share prices. 
Where public projects are financed through 
taxation, all investors (taxpayers) are on an equal 
footing. The argument is that the distribution of 
returns (or losses) from publicly financed projects 
is fairer with public (tax) finance. 
Governments' Information Advantages 
The second argument lies with the interconnections 
between projects. Investment in some projects 
often has important implications for other parts of 
the economy. For example, investments in all 
forms of transport infrastructure are 
interdependent The private sector may be 
unwilling to invest in rail because of uncertainty 
about the road-building programme. The 
government can exploit its superior information 
when making investment decisions. The private 
sector risk premium is increased by lack of 
knowledge of public sector policy. A counter-
argument is that many public projects have a long 
duration and it is not necessarily the case that 
current governments are any better at predicting the 
policy of future governments than is the private 
sector. Is the current administration really in a 
better position than the private sector to predict 
transport policy twenty years from now? 
Cost of Capital in the Private and Public Sectors 
The final argument in favour of public investment 
is that the cost of capital is lower in the public 
sector because governments can borrow more 
cheaply than private firms. This is based on an 
incorrect view of what is really meant by the "cost 
of capital". The true cost of capital for a project is 
determined not by the cost of borrowing but by cost 
of borrowing and the risk associated with the 
project. A government may be able to borrow 
cheaper than the private sector, but this has nothing 
to do with the inherent riskiness of the projects it 
selects. The cost of borrowing is lower in the 
public sector because governments rarely default 
on their debts. As John Kay puts it: 
"The view that 'private sector capital 
costs more' is naive, because the cost 
of debt to government and to firms is 
influenced predominantly by the 
perceived risk of default rather than an 
assessment of the quality of returns 
from the specific investment. We 
would lend to government even if we 
thought it would bum the money or 
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fire it off into space1, and we do lend it 
for both these purposes" (John Kay, 
1993) 
Governments decide whether taxpayers should bear 
the risk of any project or whether the risk should be 
sold to the private sector. If they decide in favour 
of the former (tax finance) they can fund the 
project at the "risk-free rate" - the rate at which 
they can borrow. If they opt for the latter, they have 
to offer the private sector a sufficiently attractive 
reward for bearing the risk. While private investors 
expect to receive a greater return the higher the 
level of risk, governments can coerce taxpayers 
into accepting risk without any compensating 
return. 
As an example, suppose that a Scottish 
administration had to attract investors rather than 
force taxpayers to pay for its investment schemes. 
It proposed two projects, one to provide a light 
railway in Edinburgh, the other to build a major 
international airport on Barra. Treating investors in 
the same way as taxpayers, it would offer the same 
returns on both projects. Most sane investors would 
give the Barra project a wide berth because the 
return offered by the government would not be 
sufficient to compensate them for the huge risk 
associated with this project. Risky projects would 
not be undertaken so long as government failed to 
compensate investors for the risks that they might 
run. 
Nevertheless, there is a further argument that the 
cost of tax finance is lower than that of private 
finance. It is that taxpayers are better at bearing 
risk than are private investors. Is the "risk 
premium" of taxpayers lower than that of private 
investors? If this is correct, then one could argue 
that the public sector cost of capital is genuinely 
less than that in the private sector. The standard 
argument in favour of this view has to do with risk 
spreading. Where there many investors, risks are 
widely spread and the premium above the risk-free 
rate that any single individual might demand for 
accepting this risk is relatively small. Because of 
the huge number of taxpayers compared with 
private investors, the cost of financing a public 
project using taxation is very close to the "risk-
free" rate. Note that with widening share ownership 
both directly and through pension schemes the 
difference in the size of these groups is decreasing. 
However, if this argument is correct then the risk 
1
 Note that this example is unrealistic in relation to Scotland 
because the exploitation of space is a reserved matter under the 
Devolution Act. 
premium is lower for tax finance, and therefore its 
cost is genuinely lower than that of private finance. 
This argument has an important implication for 
Scotland. Following the Devolution Act the 
Westminster government will not compensate the 
Scottish executive if public investment projects in 
Scotland fail by way of additional funding outside 
the Barnett formula. Where these are funded 
publicly, Scottish taxpayers, who comprise about 9 
per cent of all UK taxpayers, will bear the entire 
risk of failure. This implies that for a Scottish 
taxpayer, the risk associated with a Scottish project 
funded by Holyrood compared with the same 
project funded by Westminster is greater by a 
factor of approximately eleven. This implies that 
the public sector cost of capital in a devolved 
Scotland is actually higher than that based on 
Westminster. The reason is that there are fewer 
taxpayers over which to spread the risk and 
therefore the individual "risk premium" is greater. 
To give an example, suppose that the Scottish 
government decided to build another road-bridge 
over the Forth. This would be a substantial project 
carrying substantial risks, such as cost overruns, 
structural failure, unpredictability of revenues etc. 
If it were funded from the Scottish exchequer, this 
risk would be borne by Scottish taxpayers. They 
would receive no compensation for this risk 
because the government "borrows" from them at 
the risk-free rate. Further, each Scottish taxpayer 
would have to shoulder a substantially higher risk 
than would be the case if the funding came from 
the UK government If it were privately financed, 
these risks would be transferred to the shareholders 
of the companies involved. If for some reason the 
bridge failed, it would be the company rather than 
the government that would have to bear the 
consequences. 
Of course Scots presently bear part of the risk for 
the failure of projects south of the border. It is not 
clear that these liabilities will disappear after 
devolution because the UK government will retain 
control over almost all tax raising powers 
throughout the UK. It is therefore at liberty to raise, 
for example, income tax or VAT to pay for capital 
projects outside Scotland. 
Even if Scottish taxpayers were not forced to bear 
the risk of projects in England and Wales, there is 
still an argument that devolution will raise the 
public sector cost of capital in Scotland. It is that 
public projects tend to be very "lumpy". Spreading 
more projects over a larger population (such as the 
whole of the UK) gives a greater chance that 
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projects that fail will be offset by ones that 
succeed. The argument is again one of risk 
spreading. The risk premium is higher the smaller 
is the tax base.2 
To summarise, the benefits of private sector 
finance lie principally in the efficiency gains that 
stem from the disciplines associated with external 
control. Against this is the argument that gains and 
losses from privately funded projects are not 
distributed as evenly as they are when tax finance 
is used. In addition, the private sector may be wary 
of projects whose returns may be influenced by 
unknown future government policies. Finally, the 
cost of borrowing does not truly reflect the cost of 
capital because it does not take account of the cost 
of risk. Under public finance, taxpayers are simply 
coerced into holding risk. But in a world of 
efficient capital markets, the only reason that might 
suggest a real difference in the cost of capital 
between private and public sectors is that the cost 
of bearing risk is lower with tax finance. The 
reason is that risk is more widely spread than is the 
case with private finance. 
Devolution will reduce the size of the population 
that will bear the risk of public projects in 
Scotland. This will increase the risk premium and 
should shift the balance towards private finance. It 
is less risky for Scottish taxpayers to buy into 
services provided by the private sector than to 
supply these services itself. 
Scots have never been particularly enthusiastic 
about using private finance to provide public 
services even though many have benefited 
privately from the purchase of shares in privatised 
firms. This lack of enthusiasm seems to conflict 
with the view of the "canny Scot" that would prefer 
to avoid risk and thus, by implication, to prefer to 
buy the services supplied by capital assets rather 
than take the risk of building them and then 
consuming their services. 
We conclude this section by noting that the main 
implication of the above discussion is that the 
arguments relating to the efficiency of the private 
sector compared with the public sector will still 
hold after devolution, as will the contrary 
arguments relating to adverse selection and the 
interconnectedness of projects. The one area that is 
affected by devolution is the relative cost of capital 
in the public and private sectors, with public 
finance becoming relatively more expensive 
2
 The lessons of history support the view that large projects 
supported on a small tax base carry substantial risk. The Darien 
Scheme in the 1690s cost Scotland over 25 per cent of its capital 
reserves and hastened the Act of Union. 
because of the increased risk that Scottish 
taxpayers might be coerced into bearing. 
In the next section, we examine the current UK 
policy on private/public funding of capital projects 
- the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which will be 
the starting point for the new parliament 
SECTION 3 THE PRIVATE FINANCE 
IMITATIVE 
The last administration introduced the Public 
Finance Initiative to bring private sector funding 
into public projects. As a result it reduced the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) by 
taking some capital transactions outside the public 
sector's balance sheet On a cash accounting basis, 
this improved the government's financial accounts 
at a time when there was international attention on 
the PSBR as an indicator of macroeconomic 
performance. As mentioned earlier, the reduction in 
the PSBR is unlikely to have had any substantial 
effect on the cost of borrowing. 
The PFI was also aimed at bringing private sector 
management into areas that had traditionally been a 
public sector preserve. The Conservatives argued 
that this would lead to an increase in efficiency. 
Each PFI scheme had to have all of the following 
characteristics: 
1. funding had to come from the private sector 
2. a substantial amount of risk had to be 
transferred to the private sector 
3. the project had to offer value for money to the 
taxpayer 
Projects could be paid for by the public-sector 
purchaser - as in the case of the M74 or by direct 
charges for usage as in the case of the Skye bridge 
or by a combination of the two. 
The take up of PFI has disappointed successive 
governments. This has been attributed to the 
complexity of the procedures necessary to set up a 
project. There have been several attempts to 
simplify and speed up the process of constructing 
and submitting applications. The basic structure of 
the PFI has, however, remained unchanged. 
If the Scottish parliament is to maintain support for 
this approach to funding public projects, it must be 
convinced that the PFI approach is superior to the 
alternatives. In other words, it must believe that 
solutions where assets are owned by the private 
sector are superior to those where ownership is in 
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the public sector. In practice, it should not matter 
where ownership of assets lies providing the 
following conditions hold: 
1. service contracts are complete and 
2. the contracting process is efficient. 
The first of these conditions implies that, in writing 
a PFI contract, the client (the public sector) and the 
supplier (the private contractor) are able to cover 
all eventualities that might arise in the course of the 
contract to supply the public sector with a flow of 
services. The difficulty of writing such a contract, 
when its length is typically from 25 to 30 years 
depends on the nature of the service being 
provided. For example, it would be hazardous to 
write a long-term contract at present for 
communication services due to rapid technological 
change in the industry. In contrast, the services 
provided by building another bridge over the Clyde 
would be more predictable and therefore more easy 
to agree in a contract. 
The second condition relates to the idea mat the 
bidding process for any PFI contract should be 
competitive. It should drive out any excess profits 
that the private sector might seek to make. At 
present, public sector agencies are encouraged to 
keep as many firms as possible involved in the 
bidding process for as long as possible. This is 
difficult with provision of some types of asset 
where the range of assets is rather narrow. 
The private-sector price includes a risk-premium 
that the public sector would not normally 
incorporate when costing the provision of a capital 
asset. As mentioned above, taxpayers are simply 
coerced into accepting risk by government. One 
would therefore expect that the actual cost of 
public sector provision would be lower. But the 
Scottish population would bear the costs if the 
project fails to meet its objectives. 
With the PFI as the starting point, the Scottish 
parliament will therefore have to decide a policy on 
capital funding. It has a number of possibilities: 
1. It could opt for public sector funding from the 
Scottish block grant. This would mean paying 
for capital spending as it occurred. No long-
term liability is incurred, but larger projects 
would put substantial pressure on die Scottish 
parliament's current spending. All of the 
project risk would be borne by Scottish 
taxpayers. 
2. It could use its tax-varying powers of 3p in the 
pound on the standard rate of income tax. In 
addition to the issues under (1), selection of 
this option would have to take account of any 
incentive effects of the change in Scottish tax 
rates relative to those in the rest of the UK. 
The size of projects funded from this extra tax 
revenue would be limited to around £690m per 
year. For example, it would take more around 
seven years of the full application of the 3p 
increase simply to pay off Scottish local 
authorities housing debt 
3. It could retain the option of private sector 
funding. Although the PFI has received limited 
support in Scotland, it is useful to have some 
examples where the advantages of reducing 
public sector risk and private sector efficiency 
can be calibrated. Further, although PFIs may 
have a role in promoting public investment, 
particularly when investment funds are scarce, 
it is inefficient to assume that all public 
projects should be funded through the PFI 
mechanism. Adverse selection, the 
mterconnectedness of projects and the 
difficulty of specifying service contracts are all 
valid reasons for favouring public funding. 
Thus, on the grounds of both efficiency and 
risk-spreading, the principle of having a 
"mixed economy" where private and public 
funds are used as appropriate is sound. 
Given these options, any policy should take 
account of die following points from the previous 
discussion: 
1. The relative advantages die private sector 
involvement are greatest where: 
a) Contracts can be precisely specified over 
long periods of time 
b) There is die possibility of strong 
competition between private sector providers 
c) The efficiency of public sector provision is 
questionable when judged against comparable 
private-sector enterprises. 
2. Increased private sector involvement is 
dependent on efficient and rapid decision 
making machinery in die public sector. Many 
public sector bodies tiiat are at arm's lengdi to 
the Scottish Office can initiate PFI projects. 
There is a need to more clearly focus the 
expertise diat does exist so that diose 
bargaining on behalf of me public sector can 
learn from experience and not negotiate with 
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the private sector from a position of weakness. 
3. As mentioned above, PFIs create future 
liabilities on the public sector. If many 
different bodies are able to independently 
initiate PFI projects, there is a potential loss of 
control of public sector liabilities. Better 
control will require that the Scottish Office 
accounts more clearly reflect future 
commitments in the form of debt repayments 
or PFI service contract payments. 
4. If a decision in principle is taken to have a 
mixture of bom private and public sector 
funding, the difficulty will come in deciding 
how individual projects are to be funded. 
There is clearly an argument for some 
independent body to report, say, to a Finance 
Committee of the parliament as to appropriate 
funding mechanisms for particular projects. 
5. There is also an argument for policy to allow 
for the possibility of "shared" risk between the 
private and public sectors. Current policy 
precludes risk-sharing. So long as contracts 
can be written that clearly assign risk, there 
may be advantages in such joint arrangements. 
For example, efficiency gains may be possible 
through the adoption of private sector 
techniques. Clearly, the private sector would 
expect a realistic return for the share of the risk 
that they might bear. 
Two final issues are worth discussing in this 
section. The first is a change in the public sector 
accounting system that will improve policy 
discussions mat relate to the balance of current and 
capital spending in the public sector. The UK 
government has been moving towards a system of 
"resource accounting" for some time. Its purpose is 
to improve the planning and control of public 
spending by gaining a clearer perspective on the 
assets held in public ownership and the costs and 
revenues associated with these. This approach 
contrasts with the simple cash budgeting that has 
been used up to now and which takes no account of 
capital assets. 
The change will result in an accurate inventory of 
the assets held by government departments. This 
will enable departments to budget for maintenance 
and depreciation costs so that they better 
understand the true costs of capital. It will also 
allow departments to plan expenditures around 
their capital assets in a more rational way than has 
been possible with simple year-on-year cash 
budgeting. Finally, resource accounting will permit 
a closer matching of objectives and resource use in 
each department. 
The system will therefore provide much of the 
information necessary to properly cost existing 
capital assets in the public sector. However, given 
the previous discussion, if departments are to 
budget properly, they also need to include 
information in their accounts on the future 
liabilities that they may have incurred through PFI 
schemes. 
This form of accounting will also help in the 
calibration of the fiscal rules that the UK 
government plans to introduce in me near future 
which is the final issue discussed in this section. 
The UK government intends to introduce new 
fiscal rules in the near future that will require 
explicit identification of the capital and current 
sides of government spending. These rules were 
laid out in Gordon Brown's 1998 budget and are 
called the "Golden Rule" and die "Sustainable 
Investment Rule". 
The Golden Rule has the closest parallel to the 
activities of the Scottish parliament Its essence is 
that over an economic cycle the government should 
only borrow for investment purposes. It should not 
borrow to fund current spending. In a recession, 
government revenue falls and welfare payments 
increase. Some increase in borrowing is therefore 
likely. Averaged out over the cycle, however, 
borrowings for current spending should be zero. 
Thus, during the boom phase of the cycle, the 
government should be repaying the extra 
borrowings it made during the recession to pay for 
higher welfare payments. 
"The Government is determined to build a fiscal 
framework that encourages sound and responsible 
decision making so that policy is set in the UK's 
long-term interest The golden rule and the 
distinction between current and capital spending 
lie at the heart of our new approach to fiscal 
policy." Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, HM Treasury News Release 8/6/98 
(italics added) 
Although the Scottish parliament will have no 
long-term borrowing facility, the golden rule does 
carry an important message for a devolved 
Scotland. It lies in Gordon Brown's motivation for 
introducing this discipline to UK fiscal policy. Two 
main arguments have been used in favour of the 
Golden Rule. First it is suggested that the financial 
probity that it forces on the public sector will 
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promote a stable, low-inflation, high-growth 
environment. Second it is argued that it is unfair to 
future generations to burden them with debt which 
gives them no corresponding flow of benefits. 
Borrowing to spend money on this generation's 
unemployment benefit has no direct impact on the 
wellbeing of future generations, but they will 
become at least partly responsible for its repayment 
if it is debt-financed, most probably through higher 
taxes. In the jargon of economics, the Golden Rule 
will promote inter-generational equity. 
Both these arguments have relevance to Holyrood. 
First, transparent probity in its use of the public 
purse will be necessary, if not sufficient, to 
reassure parts of the private sector who have been 
deeply sceptical of the devolution exercise. 
Without full co-operation from the private sector, it 
is difficult to see how a growth agenda can be 
pursued successfully. Second, just like 
Westminster, Holyrood has a duty to future 
generations. Too much current spending and too 
little public investment will place an unfair burden 
on our descendants. It is important for Holyrood to 
take this duty seriously. 
Some help for this process is at hand. Future 
reports on government spending in Scotland will 
distinguish between current and capital spending. 
This will be made possible through the introduction 
of resource accounting. This will mean mat shortly 
after it has been set up, the Scottish Parliament will 
have available to it a breakdown of the spending 
which it controls not only by department but also 
by its purpose - current or capital. This process will 
permit both the parliament and the Scottish people 
to take a broad view on how government is 
allocating its spending between current and capital 
purposes and on its current and future liabilities. 
SECTION 4 - CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered some of the issues 
relating to the treatment of public investment by 
the Holyrood parliament At a theoretical level, 
there are arguments both for and against using the 
private ownership of projects that supply services 
to the public. The strongest of those in favour is 
that the private sector faces efficiency-promoting 
incentives that cannot be fully applied to the public 
sector. Against, there is the problem that using 
taxpayers to fund projects is generally equitable 
and the government may have an information 
advantage where projects are interconnected. The 
final theoretical issue is the relative cost of capital 
in the private and public sectors. The cost of capital 
has to be distinguished from the cost of borrowing. 
The essence of the difference is the premium that is 
paid for risk in a private market. Public sector 
projects are not immune from risk, but 
governments are able to coerce taxpayers into 
bearing this risk. When Scotland has a devolved 
parliament, the risk associated with any project will 
be spread over a much smaller number of taxpayers 
than is the case with the UK parliament Individual 
risk will rise sharply and therefore the argument for 
"selling" the risk to the private sector is 
strengthened. In essence this suggests that the 
parliament should be more amenable to arguments 
that the public sector should buy services from the 
private sector rather than taking the risk of 
constructing capital assets to provide these 
services. 
Note that under Schedule 5 of the Devolution Act, 
the Scottish parliament would not be able to 
regulate any public enterprise that it might decide 
to privatise. Hence, for example, if the Parliament 
took the decision to privatise the water industry in 
Scotland, it would be regulated by OFWAT. This 
somewhat anomalous position arises because 
competition and the regulation of industry is a 
reserved matter. One partial solution would be for 
the appropriate regulator at UK level to establish 
direct links with the Scottish parliament. The 
regulator could then provide a useful service to the 
Parliament by investigating restraints on trade 
within Scotland as well as acting as conduit for 
Scottish views on regulation. 
In practical terms the starting point for the new 
parliament will be the existing PFI policy. 
Although this policy has been beset by difficulties, 
it does provide a framework for transferring risk 
from the public to the private sector. The Holyrood 
parliament may find its block grant and tax powers 
so limiting that it has no option but to look to the 
private sector for project funding. There are 
anyway arguments for mamtaining a "mixed 
economy" of private and public funding to provide 
the maximum flexibility for the taxpayer and to 
provide efficiency comparisons. However, private 
sector funding is unlikely to be successful where it 
is difficult to specify precisely the contract for the 
flow of services that the public sector is to receive 
over the 25 to 30 year lifetime of the investment. It 
is also unlikely to offer best value in areas that 
might be affected by other aspects of government 
policy. In contrast, private funding should be 
favoured where there are strong efficiency 
arguments in favour of the private sector and where 
there is a strong argument that the risk should be 
transferred to the private sector. 
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Two changes in UK government policy should help 
to make these arguments less opaque. The first is 
the switch to resource accounting, which will force 
government departments to identify the assets that 
they own and the associated costs. The second is 
the introduction of the "Golden Rule", which will 
govern public sector borrowing. One of the 
arguments in favour of this is that of equity 
between generations. It is not fair to future 
generations to encumber them with debt associated 
with either current spending or with non-
performing assets. The Scottish parliament will be 
inundated with proposals to increase the level of 
current spending. It is important that these 
pressures do not lead it to fail in its duty to those 
future generations that do not yet have a vote. This 
can only be done if the appropriate information is 
available. Hopefully the change to resource 
accounting will facilitate this process. 
Taking all of these arguments together would seem 
to suggest the following: 
1. The parliament should (and may have to) use 
both public and private finance to support 
public projects. 
2. For reasons of risk-spreading, the balance will 
swing in favour of private finance once the 
Scottish parliament comes into existence 
3. The parliament should set up an independent 
body with a remit to examine the options for 
the funding of all public projects in Scotland 
and report to a Finance committee of the 
parliament. This body should also consider 
how the rules for agreeing private sector 
funding may be simplified and how 
competition between private sector bodies for 
public projects can be encouraged. 
4. The parliament should establish links with 
industry regulators so mat the Parliament" s as a 
conduit for Scotland's views on regulation and 
so that the regulator can be called on to deal 
with issues that directly affect Scottish 
enterprises. 
5. The annual accounts of the parliament should 
distinguish clearly between capital and current 
spending. They should also show interest 
payments on previously incurred debt and the 
implied liabilities for the public sector that are 
associated with long-term contracts to buy 
services from assets provided by the private 
sector. 
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